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TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A Conceptual Approach
Major Christopher D. Kolenda, U.S. Army

T

ransformation has been defined correctly as a process rather than an end
state. Still, nagging questions linger. What is the purpose of transformation?
Toward what goal is military transforming headed? What do we want the future
military to do? What should it look like? How should it fight? The transformation, to be meaningful, must lead coherently from a present state toward an envisioned future condition. Transformation, therefore, is most precisely a strategy
designed purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future. Absent this articulation of purpose, transformation risks moving in the wrong direction—or in
no direction at all. The key, to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Donald R.
Rumsfeld, is to have the right ladder standing against the right wall.
The struggle from which such a purpose may be derived has been a powerful subtext of the transformaMajor Kolenda is an armor officer and graduate of the
tion debate and has indeed informed arguments over
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West Point, New York; and served as operations officer of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. He earned a
each trying to improve what it does best. Problems
master of arts degree in modern European history from
naturally arise with this approach, particularly in
the University of Wisconsin. He has written several artiareas such as joint interoperability and lift, by air and
cles for professional military journals and is editor and
coauthor of Leadership: The Warrior’s Art (U.S. Army
sea—areas that are crucial for effectiveness at the joint
War College Foundation Press, 2001). He is also a
level but that might get low priority from an individmember of the Council for Emerging National Security
ual service perspective. Still, it is important not to
Affairs (CENSA). An earlier version of this article won
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rush; making the intellectual effort to get the vision
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right is crucial. Heading, however purposefully, in a
Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 2
self-defeating direction would be disastrous.
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Up to this point, unfortunately, the debate about transformation and the future of the military has remained largely rooted in technology. We need to update our understanding of the nature of war and use it as a touchstone. The
future will belong not necessarily to the most technologically advanced combatant but the one that understands the nature of war and can most effectively cope
with and exploit it. Such understanding is a necessary backdrop for the development of vision and thereafter the intellectual, cultural, organizational, and technological components of transformation.
This article seeks to expand the debate to the necessary scope by proposing a
set of ideas to synthesize the enduring nature of war with contemporary technological realities, to bridge the gap between new technology and broad transformation. These ideas emerge from five critical postulates about the enduring
nature of war:
1. Information in war is “essentially dispersed.”
2. War is Chaotic.
3. Combatants in war are complex adaptive systems.
4. War is a nonlinear phenomenon.
5. War is the realm of uncertainty.

The insights from those postulates suggest that our armed forces will be most
effective if we master the following concepts:
1. Decentralization: create and exploit a knowledge advantage by empowerment at
the appropriate levels.
2. Complexity: gain a complexity advantage by maximizing the number of meaningful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly so.
3. Resilience: sustain balance and equilibrium in our own force while creating and
exploiting instability and disorder in the enemy.
4. Tempo: sustain an intensity of operations over time with which the enemy cannot cope.

The apparent lessons from conflicts over the past ten years point to an emerging paradigm about transformation, known as the “information technology
revolution in military affairs” (IT-RMA). Simply put, this increasingly popular
thesis suggests that information superiority plus precision munitions equals
1
victory. Decision makers will have a “near-omniscient view of the battlefield”
that will enable them to direct precision munitions onto targets with such rapid
and lethal effect that enemies will be reduced to “awe,” “shock,” or “paralysis,”
and in any case be “locked out” of the objectives they wish to pursue. Either way,
in this view, the enemy will have no choice but to give up.
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Embedded in the paradigm is the assumption that standoff precision munitions delivered primarily from air or sea forces will have maximum effect on the
enemy with minimal risk to American lives and of collateral damage. A related
assumption is that an omniscient view of the battlefield will make centralization
2
of authority possible, indeed inevitable. Recent events in Kosovo and Afghani3
stan illustrate the new reality. Indeed the commander in chief of U.S. Central
Command was reportedly admonished for a DESERT STORM–like plan for in4
vading Iraq and was told to make it “look more like Afghanistan.”
By continuing to focus almost exclusively on technology, the U.S. armed
forces risk developing strategies, force structures, and warfighting concepts that
5
are at odds with the nature of war. As Secretary Rumsfeld has argued, transforming America’s military means changing “how we think about war,” encour6
aging a culture of creativity and risk taking. Transformation, therefore, has
important intellectual and cultural components, which must turn technological
7
advances into a more effective military. Consideration of these other components of transformation, however, has too often devolved into little more than a
glib hype of exhausted adjectives. Failure to come to grips with cultural and intellectual elements of transformation risks dooming the U.S. armed forces to
8
“expensive irrelevance” and inconsequential lethality.
THE NATURE OF WAR
It is time to challenge the validity of the prevailing IT-RMA thesis by examining
some key aspects of the nature of war and offering alternative concepts that, if
pursued, would move the U.S. armed forces along the path of true, rather than
merely technological, transformation.
Information in War Is Essentially Dispersed
The Nobel Prize–winning economist Friedrich von Hayek (1900–92) argued
that information is “essentially dispersed” in the “extended market order.” Although economic theory often translates uneasily from a business to a military
context, Hayek’s concept is useful for analyzing individual and collective human
behavior. The idea provides a conceptual foundation that can enable leaders to
liberate and direct the creative genius of their people and organizations.
Hayek viewed the market as an evolutionary process of discovery and adaptation in which individuals gather, process, and interpret information and
make choices to maximize their interests. What appears to be a chaotic market
reflects in fact a “spontaneous order” that is beyond any central designing in9
telligence. “Modern economics explains how such an extended order can
come into being,” suggests Hayek, “and how it constitutes an informationgathering process, able to call up, and put to use, widely dispersed information
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that no central planning agency, let alone any individual, could know as a
10
whole, possess, or control.”
Hayek argues that information, knowledge, and understanding are dispersed
in space and time. Human beings perceive, interpret, and understand information and make decisions that reflect the lenses through which they view the
world. In the terms of modern psychology, the rationality of individuals is
11
bounded by such factors as experience, bias, education, and emotion. As a result, two people can look at the same picture and derive completely opposite
conclusions and accordingly take radically different courses of action to pursue
their interests.
The apparent dissonance can be explained, in part, by the difference between
“explicit” and “tacit” knowledge. Explicit knowledge is concrete information of
the sort that can be entered into databases and information systems; tacit knowledge comprises the implicit information and processing capabilities that indi12
viduals possess as a result of their cognitive maps and perceptual lenses. Tacit
knowledge comes into existence and manifests itself in ways peculiar and specific to context. It is drawn upon only in particular circumstances. It shapes the
way we behold information, how we create knowledge and understanding, and
the degree to which we consider each item relevant and appropriate to a
situation.
The essentially dispersed nature of information suggests that the fusion of explicit knowledge onto a situational-awareness screen does not result automatically in homogeneity of interpretation and decision. Different people, looking at
the same situation, perceive different crises and opportunities; they make different assessments of risk; and they ultimately make different decisions about how
to maximize the effectiveness of themselves and their organizations. Shared situational awareness of physical relationships on the battlefield, therefore, does
not mean shared appreciation of how to act upon the information. The essentially dispersed nature of information will remain salient in warfare. Our challenge is to “leverage” it.
War Is Chaotic
Chaos theory is a relatively new and complex branch of science and mathematics, the implications of which for human systems have only begun to be ex13
plored. Chaos contends that a system contains a certain complex order that is
determined by the nature and interrelationships of each element within it and
by each force that acts upon it. Elements within the system interact with one another and with external inputs. The system also interacts with the “feedback”
from the first interactions, creating “system perturbations” (subsequent orders
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of effects) that shape the system and ultimately make it unpredictable. The result
is a peculiar order.
Chaos need not imply disorder. A Chaotic system can be stable or unstable. It
is stable if “its particular brand of irregularity” persists in the face of disturbances (inputs), or if it returns eventually to its particular brand of irregularity.
The inputs generate certain responses from the system that may be immediately
14
unpredictable but stable over time. A Chaotic system is unstable if inputs result
15
in a permanent change in the system’s regime of behavior or nature. Chaotic
16
systems are thus complex and deterministic. Because of the system’s complexity, it is impossible to predict with absolute fidelity the impact of specific inputs
or interactions.
War is Chaotic.17 Clausewitz argued that “war is more a true chameleon that
slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” The dominant tendencies in
war—the famous “trinity” (passion, probability and chance, and reason) and
“triangle” (people, military, and government)—give each war in general, and its
combatants in particular, unique characteristics. Depending on context, these
tendencies, singly or in combination, can be resilient or fragile with respect to
particular inputs and interactions. “Our task therefore is to develop a theory
that maintains a balance between these three tendencies [of the trinity], like an
18
object suspended between three magnets.” Such insight is an implicit recogni19
tion of the Chaotic nature of war and of the combatants that participate in it.
In a similar vein, Clausewitz described the criticality of “moral factors” as the
true measurement of an organization’s combat capability. He eschewed the attempt to reduce war to fixed formulas, equations, and calculations of raw num20
bers. The continuing interaction of opposites with deterministic systems
makes war uncertain and unpredictable. Strength in moral factors gives resilience to the organization, but such resilience is not itself a fixed quantity—
moral factors can grow or recede over time. A strong and confident army can become demoralized; an unconfident and untested force can develop high morale.
The Chaotic nature of war endures. The challenge is to turn the fact to
advantage.
Combatants Are “Complex Adaptive Systems”
21
Human organizations are complex and adaptive. The individuals and teams
within the system react to inputs and adapt to changes. Sometimes those adaptations are consciously designed to maintain effectiveness in the face of a
threatening input or to capitalize upon an opportunity for growth or value
maximization. Others are subconscious or unconscious adaptations. Morale
and confidence, for instance, might decrease as efforts to cope with interactions
prove futile or, conversely, might increase as those efforts succeed.
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A way to appreciate complexity, and its potential in war, is by contrasting it
with simple and compound systems. A simple system is linear: the force of a single input will generate a proportional and predictable output. Decision making
in simplicity is fairly easy. The combatant must respond to only a single threat.
For instance, the presence of a bomber overhead will elicit a predictable “scatter”
response from a ground unit: to escape the effects of the bomber, the ground
unit disperses.
A compound system, on the other hand, is one in which two or more inputs
are present that force a combatant to make choices. Often the choice taken to
avoid one threat increases a combatant’s vulnerability to another. This time, the
ground unit is facing both a bomber and an opposing ground force. The best reaction to the bomber is dispersion, but that choice will make the unit more vulnerable to the opposing ground force. Conversely, the best choice to oppose the
ground force is to concentrate the friendly ground forces; doing so, however,
makes it more vulnerable to the bomber. The commander is on the horns of a dilemma. The combination of threats in a specific battle or context increases the
challenge for the enemy. Compound systems account for interaction at the
friendly-versus-enemy level.
A complex system is one in which interactions take place on multiple levels.
Combatants interact with more than just the enemy. In war, commanders interact within themselves—their own emotions, goals, biases, and experiences—
and with their staffs as they attempt to cope with war’s complexity while simultaneously trying to accomplish the war’s purpose. Commanders and organizations also interact with friendly forces. At the strategic level, this can be
interaction with the people and the government. At the operational and tactical
levels, this can mean interaction with adjacent forces or other instruments of national power. The activities of friendly forces shape the context in which our
own operations take place. In a similar vein, there is interaction with the external
environment. Examples of external forces are, among others, political directives,
coalitions, the physical environment, and third-party inputs to the system. The
complexity of war, therefore, increases with the number of critical interactions
and adaptations affecting the components of the Clausewitzian trinity and
triangle.
Warfare is not a single, isolated act. Interactions take place simultaneously on
various levels. As long as the system—the individual, the organization, the
country—remains resilient, it will attempt to adapt effectively to crises and opportunities. As the system becomes more fragile, its ability to sustain effectiveness erodes. Adaptations aimed at other purposes (such as individual survival)
can rise to the fore, atomizing and unraveling the fabric of the combatant.
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Evolutionary biology theory lends insight into the unpredictability of complex interaction within Chaotic systems. Although it is possible in hindsight to
trace backward the development of a species, predicting its evolution in advance
22
is not possible. Too many singular factors intervene to determine the outcome
ahead of time—that is, as in Chaotic systems, the result is deterministic but not
23
predictable. The outcomes of individual interactions, therefore, alter the general situation and affect the choices of others. They shape the nature of future in24
teractions and thus exert successive effects.
When applied to war, the concept of adaptive complexity suggests that the
number of possible outcomes increases unpredictably with the number of
25
meaningful inputs. As each side adapts to those inputs, interactions can gener26
ate effects and responses that defy prediction and expectation. Looking backward from the outcome, one can readily perceive a logical, understandable
27
unfolding of interactions. From the perspective of the observer in the midst of
the process in time and space, however, the result was only one of myriad
possibilities.
War Is a “Nonlinear Phenomenon”
The Chaotic nature and adaptive complexity of war render it a nonlinear phe28
nomenon. A linear outcome is one in which the strength of the input yields an
output of proportional strength; a nonlinear outcome is one that is not directly
29
proportional to the input. Nonlinear systems, as historian Alan Beyerchen explains, “are those that disobey proportionality or additivity. They may exhibit
erratic behavior through disproportionately large or disproportionately small
outputs, or they may involve ‘synergistic’ interactions in which the whole is not
30
equal to the sum of its parts.” In a nutshell, a nonlinear outcome is one that defies the logic and science of linearity.
Nonlinear systems are living, animate, and adaptive. They can change over
31
time and by interaction with their contexts. As Chaos and complexity theories
suggest, the alterations that result can move the system into a qualitatively different nature or regime of behavior. Nonlinearity helps to explain why even
subtle inputs to the system sometimes yield inordinately large outputs and, conversely, why large inputs may have only minor effects. Small changes to initial
conditions in a fragile system can lead to outcomes that defy proportionality,
while large inputs to a resilient system might simply be absorbed. A given input
can yield different outcomes at different times, because the nature of the system
32
at any moment is dependent upon context. As Beyerchen summarizes, “The
heart of the matter is that the system’s variables cannot be effectively isolated
from each other or from their context; linearization is not possible, because dy33
namic interaction is one of the system’s defining characteristics.”

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

7

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 9
KOLENDA

107

To recognize war as a nonlinear phenomenon is to acknowledge that no single formula, equation, methodology, or capability can predict outcomes or guarantee victory. Inputs can cause effects that are disproportionately large or small;
they can cause “system perturbations” and unintended consequences, responses
to which can lead in turn to successive effects that change the situation funda34
mentally but could scarcely have been anticipated. Effective adaptation to the
unpredictability of warfare remains a fundamental challenge.
War Is the “Realm of Uncertainty”
35
Warfare, then, is by nature uncertain. Prevailing concepts of uncertainty, however, are inadequate. Uncertainty is commonly understood as a matter of infor36
mation. If that is the case, the argument that information superiority, or
37
“dominant battlespace knowledge,” can “lift the fog of war” is plausible. Uncertainty, however, is not reducible to information. To be sure, simple uncertainties,
unknown but attainable pieces of information, can be reduced radically by technology. But simple uncertainties merely scratch the surface of the issue.
An uncertainty not necessarily reducible to existing information concerns
the future. According to one influential study, such situations of future uncertainty can be grouped into four categories. In the first, a “clear enough future,”
forecast precisely enough for strategic development, is apparent—though absolute certainty is impossible, the future seems to point inexorably in a single strategic direction. In other cases, “alternate futures,” a few discrete outcomes are
plausible. In a third category the actual outcome can lie anywhere along a broad
(but bounded) continuum: a “range of futures” in which no discrete outcomes
are obvious. True “ambiguity” is the last category. In this case there is no basis
38
upon which to forecast the future.
Aside from those that result from gaps in information and those relating to
the future, there are several other types of uncertainty that are crucial to an un39
derstanding of war. Intrinsic uncertainty results from “bounded rationality”—
the existence of a gulf between perception and reality. Cognitive biases, emotions, assumptions, experiences, education, and heuristics all shape the meaning
people elicit from information. This type of uncertainty accounts for the phenomenon of two people seeing the same things and deriving different conclusions. Particularly in complex, unique, and ambiguous environments, the
decisions and actions arising from bounded rationality can be highly unpredictable. Frictional uncertainty deals with the inability to predict precisely how the
“friction of war” will manifest itself. Equipment failures and performance
anomalies form a part, but more importantly, so do poor communication, fear,
danger, exhaustion, disobedience, initiative, will, inertia, and other human
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factors. These frictions can affect individuals and organizations in ways that
defy prediction and expectation.
Dynamic uncertainty is the most problematic, because it results from interaction. The concepts of Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity underscore
the inherent unpredictability in war that results when forces interact. An input
that generates a certain response from one system will likely elicit a much different one from another. Destroying a communications network, for instance,
might make one combatant unwilling to continue the war; it might merely stimulate another combatant to increase the intensity of resistance. Such outcomes
40
result from complex interactions that defy precise modeling and forecasting.
Intrinsic, frictional, and future uncertainties exacerbate the problem.
Coping with uncertainty has traditionally meant collecting more information. In this approach, the decision maker must have a sense of what is knowable and accessible and what is not. He or she must also understand the cost of
additional information and determine whether the effort is worthwhile. The
decision maker uses analyses refined on the basis of the new information to develop strategies to shape or adapt to developments and to determine the right
41
“portfolio of actions” in response to them. Uncertainty has been something
to be overcome (by information) or something to “bind” (by anticipating the
future).
The existence of frictional, intrinsic, and dynamic uncertainties suggests that
the old paradigm is incomplete. Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity
suggest that instability and fragility in the system can lead to highly contingent,
disproportionate, and dysfunctional outcomes. Coping in advance with uncertainty requires creating the conditions necessary for resilience. Second, uncertainty demands versatility and flexibility if crises and opportunities are to be
responded to in a manner that derives maximum advantage. Last, this broader
concept demands an approach to war that focuses on the creation and exploitation of uncertainty in the enemy.
TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A combatant who understands the nature of war and can not only cope with
but exploit it will have a decided advantage. This perspective can open new and
more appropriate pathways toward real transformation. It also can serve as a
reference point from which to evaluate the IT-RMA thesis and to suggest alternatives to a myopic focus on technology. Our ability to do so will in many ways
determine the effectiveness of our armed forces in both the present and the
future; it depends, in turn, on our ability to master four basic conceptual
approaches.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 9
KOLENDA

109

Decentralization
A knowledge advantage can be exploited by empowering people at the lowest
possible level. The notion that information is essentially dispersed in the extended order of the battlefield, coupled with the fact that shared information
does not necessarily imply a shared appreciation as to how to respond to it, leads
to fundamental questions regarding how organizations should be commanded
and controlled. One part of the issue concerns whether a centralized or decen42
tralized approach is more effective.
The increasing transparency of the battlefield makes the impulse for centralization more difficult to control. The argument is that very senior commanders
now have “dominant battlespace knowledge”; that they know everything necessary to make rapid and sound decisions. The interconnectedness of the organization, in this view, enables the commander to transmit those decisions
instantaneously to subordinates and monitor precisely how those orders are implemented. The core assumptions of this argument are that shared information leads to shared understanding, that decisions are made most effectively at
higher echelons of organization, that organizations consist of “decision entities”
controlling “actor entities”—and that networks permit fewer of the former to
control more of the latter.
Such centralization of authority, however, would suboptimize the performance of the military and the people who constitute it, because, as studies in the
behavioral sciences have shown, bounded rationality is intrinsic to human nature. In a crisis, as we have seen, one person might respond conservatively while
43
another person recognizes a fleeting opportunity worth significant risk. Centralizing authority has the unfortunate consequence of limiting battlefield understanding to a single “decision entity.” That might seem safe, in that a senior
commander is presumably less likely, by virtue of experience and education, to
make a poor decision than a more junior commander. However, the creative ten44
sion that results from competing perspectives is lost. Moreover, removing from
junior leaders the sense of responsibility, “ownership,” and empowerment decreases motivation, retards creative thinking and problem solving, and results
generally in less effective execution. The likelihood that decisions will not be executed in the manner intended increases with psychological distance between
45
decision maker and actor.
Empowerment of professionals at the lowest possible levels is the most effective guarantor of excellence. Technology should unleash the power of people
rather than handcuff it. Liberating the creative genius of people can create a certain complex order in an operation that no central authority could conceive or
direct and that no enemy could fully comprehend or counter. In any case, the
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idea that information is essentially dispersed argues for a similar decentraliza46
tion of authority.
Decentralization, it is important to note, has its limits. Empowering untrained subordinates merely leads to poor decisions made more quickly; dissemination of authority in the absence of direction or guidance can produce
disjointed activity that fails to accomplish the purpose of the operation, even
impedes it. Leaders must define the creative space in which their subordinates
are free to act. Statements of commander’s intent, mission, boundaries, rules of
engagement, and main effort are traditional methods of bounding that space
and providing reference points. A new approach to the same problem is “effects
basing”—explaining the effects a commander wants to achieve and how ground,
sea, and space forces and other elements of national power interrelate, while allowing subordinate commanders to determine precisely how to achieve those effects. Leaders can also utilize “permissive” rules of engagement, instructions,
47
and control measures designed to accelerate the decision-action cycle.
To be sure, the senior leader must have confidence that a subordinate will
make sound decisions. Training, education, and mutual understanding gained
through acquaintanceships are natural foundations of mutual trust. Ad hoc organizations, accordingly, have difficulty with decentralization. We need to develop understanding and trust in the necessary depth at the operational level in
peacetime so that it can be drawn upon in war. Standing joint task force staffs
that train and communicate routinely with the tactical commanders and organizations they are likely to employ in action might prove important. We should
also examine institutional impediments that create impulses toward micromanagement: how long officers remain in command positions, the education
and training they receive, and how often command teams and staff teams operate together.
Information in the hands of people who cannot act on it is worth little; in the
hands of those who can, it creates complex synergies of unimaginable power. We
can guarantee suboptimal performance by centralizing authority while placing
relatively powerless people in harm’s way, or we can create a culture that truly
transforms how we operate. Technology is neutral in this regard. A “culture of
confidence” requires self-discipline and a relentless passion for excellence. Such
a culture likewise relies upon junior professionals to be worthy of trust—an is48
sue, to be sure, that deserves more attention. The ability of commanders to educate and train professional subordinates, give them the authority they need,
promote innovative thinking and responsible risk taking, and resist the urge to
micromanage is crucial to warfighting effectiveness. Finally, creating the right
culture requires institutions and systems that enhance rather than impede decentralization. Technology gives us tools to fight with. The degree to which we
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can liberate and focus the creative genius of educated and trained professionals
will determine how well we fight.
Complexity
A complexity advantage can be achieved by maximizing the number of meaningful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly
so. Complexity increases further if interactions occur at multiple levels. It also
rises when response to one interaction creates “system perturbations” to which a
combatant must respond as well. The most effective way to gain the complexity
advantage is by combining the concept of “effects-based operations” with joint
49
capabilities.
The notion that standoff precision munitions alone can generate the right effects and produce the psychological collapse of the enemy is at odds with the
idea of adaptive complexity. A thinking enemy who is determined to win will
50
find ways to mitigate the effects of standoff precision munitions. Despite their
destructive power, such weapons, employed in isolation, have limited psychological impact. Their shock value erodes rapidly, and their effects can be coun51
tered with relatively few adverse consequences.
“Complex” should not be confused with “complicated”; neither should “simple” be conflated with “simplistic.” Simple actions that pose diverse threats,
when integrated properly, produce complexity for the enemy. At the tactical
level, tasks relatively simple to understand and implement—defend from a battle
position; emplace obstacles; employ indirect fires, close air support, and rotarywing aviation; and counterattack by fire—can create, when integrated into a defensive operation, a very complex challenge for the enemy. Each threat by itself
may be easy to deal with; when they are integrated, attempts to evade or defeat
one will result in increased vulnerability to others. Threats from multiple directions and in multiple dimensions—sea, air, ground, and space—exacerbate the
complexity.
The principle applies similarly at the operational and strategic levels. Balanced,
synergistic employment of complementary capabilities to achieve effects along
“multiple lines of operation” integrates simple individual tasks into complexity
for the enemy.52 The simultaneous, integrated employment of precision-strike
and ground maneuver forces on enemy formations and critical vulnerabilities,
coupled with operational fires on second-echelon or reserve forces; special operations forces operations on strategic targets; strikes against the enemy’s communications, economy, and infrastructure; public and private diplomacy aimed at
coalition partners and third parties; and the use of economic instruments of
power are ways to generate complexity at the operational and strategic levels of
war. The increased number of options available to a balanced force to employ all
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of its elements of power in an integrated manner will complicate further the
53
range of problems with which the enemy must cope.
In addition, bringing to bear a whole array of capabilities can cause “virtual
attrition”—the diversion of assets to deal with anticipated threats—which can
make our operations even more effective at the points of focus. Faced with such
complexity, the enemy becomes more likely to make critical, even self-defeating
errors. By making our actions unpredictable enough, we may create such uncertainty for the enemy as to induce cognitive or psychological collapse. A complex
operation is far more likely to do so than a simplistic assault by a single
capability.
Resilience
Related to complexity is the concept of resilience, by which balance and equilibrium can be sustained in our own force while instability and disorder are created
and exploited in the enemy. Chaotic, complex adaptive systems such as combatants at war range in robustness from resilient to fragile. Resilient systems can absorb inputs and yet sustain, or quickly return to, their “normal” regimes of
54
behavior, while fragile systems become disordered and incoherent. Both are inherently nonlinear. We see unpredictable outcomes in war routinely—the small
resilient unit withstands and rebuffs an attack despite being vastly outnumbered; another defending unit collapses entirely in the face of an attack by a nu55
merically weaker foe. We cannot predict with certainty such disproportionate
outcomes, but we can approach the Chaotic, complex, and nonlinear natures of
war from the perspectives of resilience and fragility in order to tilt the outcomes
of interaction in our favor.
Clausewitz described the nature of combatant states in terms of the “trinity”
and “triangle,” and of the strength of armed forces with respect to physical size,
moral factors, and the relative genius of their commanders. Although such a
framework is not perfect, it does capture significant “points of attraction” that
56
together influence the degree of resilience in the system. Combatants must cultivate and sustain resilience by attending to these points of attraction at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It will be critically important to the process
of military transformation to develop the factors that influence morale, cohesion, and leadership with the same amount of energy and enthusiasm now devoted to technology.
The opposite side of the coin naturally concerns the enemy’s degree of resilience; operations should create and exploit fragility in the enemy in order to induce nonlinear outcomes in our favor. As we have seen, however, a note of
caution is in order—we must not assume that any single weapon can bring
about the inevitable collapse of the enemy. Some enemies are indeed fragile
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enough to be defeated by standoff precision munitions alone, as believed by
some theorists. A more resilient enemy, however, will sustain the will to fight.
Rather than relying on problematic assumptions of inevitable collapse after
precision-guided missile (PGM) attacks, the U.S. military needs to focus instead
on creating the conditions in which the will to fight becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. By maximizing the level of complexity and exploiting fragility we
inflict the greatest possible pressure on the enemy’s will. The complexity generated by a properly employed, balanced, joint force will create the conditions necessary for successful military operations whether the enemy’s will is strong or
weak. Understanding the nature of combatants and the relationships between
complexity and resilience is the basis of a sounder approach to warfighting.
Tempo
The concept of tempo—sustaining an intensity of operations with which the enemy cannot cope—integrates decentralization, complexity, and resilience. A
combatant’s will to resist is rarely broken by single spikes in the intensity of operations; in the respites that follow during periods of transition, the enemy re57
covers, adapts, and resumes the fight. Instead, intense, complex interactions
need to be created and maintained over an extended period of time. Operations
that integrate effects, generating the most possible at each level of war, and do so
unrelentingly have the most potential to break the enemy’s will.
Organizations require considerable structural resilience and balance to
mount such operations at high sustained tempo without exceeding the limits of
58
their own capability or endurance. To dominate transitions we need to eliminate the operational pauses that result from too little numerical strength to sustain tempo or from improperly assembled forces that cannot overcome the
effects of terrain and weather.
Studies of combat psychiatry and nonlinear dynamics indicate that disproportionate negative outcomes—cognitive or psychological collapse—occur
when systems, whether organizations or individual humans, do not have time to
59
recover their equilibrium. The ability, then, to sustain constant pressure
against the enemy’s points of leverage becomes crucial—to deny the enemy periods of rest in our transitions between offense and defense or between our successive offensive or defensive operations. Constant pressure requires not only a
balanced force but one able to win the initial fight and then to commit fresh
60
units to maintain pressure while the previously engaged units recover. The nature of the enemy determines whether and when cognitive or psychological collapse will be achieved, but we can stretch his moral factors to the limit by
“nesting” significant effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/9

14

Kolenda: Transforming How We Fight—A Conceptual Approach
114

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

by dominating transitions so as to deny the enemy any chance to recover
equilibrium.
RELEASING CREATIVE GENIUS
Technological improvement is important but, pursued in isolation, will lead us
only so far.61 We must simultaneously examine desired operational capabilities
and cultural and intellectual concepts that express how we want to fight. The
synergistic interaction of analysis and synthesis among broad categories leads to
innovation that is greater than any single approach can contribute on its own.
We will fail if we focus exclusively on technology.
One of the problems with technological evolution and revolutions in military
affairs is that the first organizations to experience such changes do not necessar62
ily come to grips with them most effectively. Technological and conceptual
change must be integrated in a manner consistent with the enduring nature of
war.
Information technology, of course, can radically improve the speed at which
orders are transmitted; create forums for dialogue between commanders struggling to interpret reality on the basis of what they see on the ground and on their
computer screens; enable commanders to apply combat power quickly to exploit
fleeting opportunities; and permit an order-of-magnitude increase in the tempo
of operations. A technology-based common operating picture can help commanders unleash the creative energies of their subordinates while ensuring that
63
their actions and decisions remain within the framework of their own intent.
However, the true magic of high-performing organizations is that professionals,
given the authority and autonomy they need within the parameters of their seniors’ vision, creatively employ their interdependent efforts in a manner that
leads to the success of the whole organization. Information technology should,
in the hands of mature and thoughtful leaders, result in empowerment and ini64
tiative rather than rigidity and overmanagement.
True transformation will be measured not by the speed of microchips but by
the effectiveness of soldiers, leaders, and organizations in the next war. We need
to stimulate and release the creative genius of our people. We must develop leaders who possess intellectual courage, who understand the theory and history—
the art and science—of their profession, who can combine education and experience into wisdom, and who can cope with the enduring nature of war and turn
it to their advantage. We need to develop resilient organizations that are cohesive, trained, confident, and ready to fight and win. Implementing warfighting
concepts and doctrines that promote resilience and agility while generating
higher complexity and operational tempo than the enemy can handle will ensure dominance even if an enemy can match or mitigate our technological
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advantages. A balanced, truly joint force armed with effective leaders, versatile
commands, and sound warfighting concepts and doctrines will be the foundation of a truly dominant military in the twenty-first century.
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12. Watts, p. 76. John Boyd argued that the “orientation” process of the OODA loop is
shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition,
previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances. I have subsumed these issues and
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than in the winter, we know when hurricane
and monsoon seasons begin and end, we
know when snowfall is likely and when it is
not. Within those large parameters, however,
we cannot predict with certainty exactly when
a hurricane will hit and where, the temperature on a specific day a month in advance, or
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Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 89.
19. As historian Alan Beyerchen observes, “But
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Tom Czerwinski (Washington, D.C.: CCRP,
1998).
22. Darwin’s central thesis of evolution is that the
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in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; and in an
unimportant manner, that is in relation to
adaptive structures, whether past or present,
by the direct action of external conditions,
and by variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously.” Cited in
Watts, p. 80. Charles Darwin, Origin of the
Species by Means of Natural Selection, Great
Books of the Western World, vol. 49, series
ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago:
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 239; see
also Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological
Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1982),
pp. 394–534.
23. Darwin’s theory of natural selection is not
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the core thesis is the only empirical theory
that is capable “of solving that most difficult
of problems posed by life anywhere in the
universe, namely, the problem of the existence of adaptive complexity.” Cited in
Watts, p. 81. Richard Dawkins, “Darwin Triumphant: Darwinism as a Universal Truth,”
in Man and Beast Revisited, ed. Michael H.
Robinson and Lionel Tiger (Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991),
p. 38; Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals
a Universe without Design (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1987), p. 317.
24. For a similar analysis of friction see Stephen J.
Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in
War and Military Policy (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 2000), pp. 200–201.
25. By “meaningful inputs” I mean inputs to the
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and actions from organizations. The level of
importance of the inputs is determined by the
degree to which they affect the combatants.
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26. See Watts, p. 79.
27. See, for instance, Fred Charles Iklé, Every
War Must End (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1971): “The final outcome of wars depends on a much wider range of factors,
many of them highly elusive—such as the
war’s impact on domestic politics or the degree to which the outside powers will intervene” (pp. 1–2).
28. Nonlinear dynamics is a branch of science
that seeks to explain why systems in the real
world routinely do not respond as predicted
by classical mathematics and Newtonian
physics. For discussions of nonlinearity see
Czerwinski.
29. Linda P. Beckerman, “The Non-Linear Dynamics of War,” Science Applications International Corporation, 1999, www.belisarius.com/
modern_business_strategy/beckerman/
non_linear.htm, p. 2.
30. Beyerchen, p. 62.
31. Military organizations often exhibit
nonlinearity. The quality of leadership, for
instance, can have a significant impact on the
combat effectiveness of an organization. As
the quality of leadership changes over time,
the organization’s effectiveness can vary
widely. Combat stress on a unit can also become transformational. What is a superb outfit
after two weeks in combat can become a dysfunctional one after two months at the front.
32. See also James G. Roche and Barry D. Watts,
“Choosing Analytic Measures,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, June 1991, pp. 165–209, and
Watts, p. 194.
33. Beyerchen, p. 66.
34. One powerful example of nonlinear behavior
comes from Samuel Huntington’s Clash of
Civilizations: “More generally, even small
amounts of violence between people of different civilizations have ramifications and consequences which civilizational violence lacks.
When Sunni gunmen killed eighteen Shi’ite
worshippers in a mosque in Karachi in February 1995, they further disrupted the peace
in the city and created a problem for Pakistan. When exactly a year earlier, a Jewish settler killed twenty-nine Muslims praying in
the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, he disrupted the Middle Eastern peace process and
created a problem for the world.” In this case,
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context was absolutely crucial in generating
nonlinear behavior that disrupted the already
fragile peace process in the Middle East.
Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 254.
35. For an in-depth examination of uncertainty
in war see Christopher D. Kolenda, Uncertainty in War: Exploring the Nature of Combat
and Conflict (Advanced Research Project,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 2002).
36. For instance, Frank M. Snyder, “Command
and Control and Uncertainty,” Naval War
College Review, March–April 1979, Owens,
pp. 14–15. Robert Leonhard seems to argue
along similar lines in asserting an inverse proportionality between “knowledge” and “ignorance.” See his Principles of War for the
Information Age (Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
1998), p. 251.
37. For further discussion see Owens; Johnson
and Libicki, eds.
38. Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick
Viguerie, “Strategy under Uncertainty,” Harvard Business Review, November–December
1997, repr. Strategy and Force Planning, 3d ed.
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2000), pp.
37–41. Vision is another part of uncertainty
about the future, not addressed in the above
study, that must be added to the construct.
Vision is an attempt to create an image of the
future and then to develop plans, policies,
and programs to achieve it. Imbedded is a degree of doubt, conscious or otherwise, over
whether the vision is the correct or best one.
The enemy attempts to achieve vision as well,
and these competing visions and implementation schemes can undermine existing plans,
create unforeseen opportunities and crises,
and even make an existing vision absolutely
untenable.
39. See Kolenda, Uncertainty in War, pp. 47–58.
40. The interactions and counteractions and the
resulting changes and adaptations that take
place create such complexity that the interacting systems defy modeling by anything less
complex than themselves.
41. Courtney et al., pp. 43–51. The authors suggest three strategic postures (shape the future, adapt to the future, and reserve the
right to play) and three payoff profiles in a
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portfolio of action (no-regrets moves, options, and big bets).
42. For discussions of centralization versus decentralization see Christopher D. Kolenda,
“Discipline: Creating the Foundation for an
Initiative-Based Organization,” in Leadership:
The Warrior’s Art (Carlisle, Penna.: Army
War College Foundation Press, 2001), and
Dandridge M. Malone, “The Integration of
Internal Operating Systems: An Application
of Systems Leadership,” in Strategic Leadership: A Multi-Organizational Perspective, ed.
Robert L. Philips and James G. Hunt
(Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1992).
Another part deals with the question of organizational structure. Should we “flatten the
hierarchy” and develop “networked” organizations, or is the current structure still useful?
Due to the increased capacity for control afforded by network-centric organizations, the
organizational structure can be flattened to
remove unnecessary and redundant layers of
commanders and staff. In light of the war on
terror, as one argument posits, the only way
to defeat a networked organization is with a
networked organization. See John Arquilla,
David F. Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed.
Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 1999). So-called networked organizations, however, seem to thrive when operating in a negative integration paradigm. They
are good at nihilistic destruction but have difficulty building cohering platforms for action. Nationalist organizations, for instance,
while effective in undermining existing governments or fighting foreign forces, have traditionally experienced severe difficulties in
attempting to build for the future. Hence, we
should exercise caution prior to assuming
that a networked organization is intrinsically
more effective than a well-functioning hierarchical system. For further study on nationalism
and nationalist organizations, see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
43. One famous example is the dispute between
General Heinz Guderian and his superiors
about how best to exploit the Sedan breakthrough in May 1940. Guderian wanted to
continue his attack to the west, while his superiors wanted to consolidate south of the
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bridgehead, defeat an impending French
counterattack, and only then resume the attack toward the Channel coast. Guderian
eventually had his way through a combination of obfuscation and downright disobedience. Had the more “prudent” approach
prevailed, the outcome of the campaign in
France might have altered significantly. For
more development see Robert Allan Doughty,
The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of
France, May 1940 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1990), pp. 218–38, and Heinz
Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Da Capo
Press, 1996), pp. 97–106.

a conflict of greater complexity might come
along that demands attention at senior levels
and faith in junior leaders to perform without
direct and overwhelming supervision. The direction taken during transformation with respect to centralization versus decentralization
of authority might make the difference between winning and losing. The term “culture
of confidence” is used effectively by Kevin
Farrell in his discussion of the German army
in the Second World War; see “Culture of
Confidence: Tactical Excellence of the German Army in the Second World War,” in
Leadership, ed. Kolenda.

44. The fear of subordinate leaders making
suboptimal decisions can be addressed
through training and education; see Kolenda,
“Discipline.”

49. For discussions of effects-based operations
see Arthur Cebrowski [Vice Adm., USN],
“President’s Forum” (pp. 5–14), and Edward
A. Smith, Jr., “Network-centric Warfare:
What’s the Point?” (pp. 59–75), Naval War
College Review 54, no. 1 (Winter 2001).
Theorists of maneuver warfare and networkcentric warfare acknowledge the Chaotic nature of war. They call for operations aimed at
generating effects upon the enemy’s will to
create paralysis, shock, and dislocation rather
than merely focusing on the physical destruction of the enemy’s forces. They recognize
implicitly that interactions that create dysfunctional instability in the enemy’s system
can result in the loss of will to fight. Nesting
effects on the enemy’s command and control
structures, on the morale of enemy armed
forces, and on a combatant’s economic infrastructure are examples of such methods. The
degree to which such operations are successful, however, depends upon the ability to
generate the destabilizing inputs and upon
the resilience of the enemy. For articles on the
necessity of balance in force structure see
Robert Scales, Future Warfare Anthology
(Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute,
1999).

45. “Distance” in this case can be viewed as psychological distance between leader and subordinate. As the psychological distance grows,
the subordinate might feel less responsible for
successful implementation of a decision or
plan. The stronger the identity of actors with
decisions, the more likely they will have a
sense of ownership and desire to see the decisions implemented properly.
46. Empowered professional individuals and
leaders throughout an organization will make
decisions and take actions designed to maximize the contributions of themselves and
their organizations toward achieving the
commander’s intent. When coupled with the
levels of excellence created by ownership and
sense of responsibility, this complex order increases the effectiveness of operations by an
order of magnitude.
47. A “free-fire area” is an example of a permissive control measure. Although restrictive in
that it prevents friendly forces from entering,
it is permissive in that enemy forces within
the area can be struck immediately without
cumbersome clearance-of-fire procedures.
48. Much ink and emotion have been spent recently about the increasing penchant for
oversupervision. A dispassionate analysis
would undoubtedly reveal that lack of confidence in the competence and judgment of
subordinates, whether justified or not, is an
important part of the cause. Recent conflicts
may have left senior leaders with relatively little to do other than micromanage affairs, but
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50. Placing air defense sites, command and control facilities, and other critical assets next to
hospitals, places of worship, and highly populated areas are adaptations designed to take
advantage of American aversion to civilian
casualties and collateral damage. Dispersing
and hiding armored forces, using decoys,
and relying more heavily on small-unit infantry operations are some ways to limit
the effectiveness of precision munitions.
Multirole chemical factories that can make
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pharmaceuticals and baby formula as well as
chemical and biological weapons are also
adaptations.
51. The campaign in Kosovo, Operation ALLIED
FORCE, is used by IT-RMA enthusiasts and
strategic bombing advocates as an example,
par excellence, of the notion that airpower
alone can win war on the cheap and should
usher in a new American way of war. The reality is a bit more complicated. Recent scholarship over the past year had added much
needed substance to the debate on all sides.
See Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen,
War over Kosovo (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2001); Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s
Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2001); and Stephen T. Hosmer, Why
Milošević Decided to Settle When He Did
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001). For an
incisive analysis of the three books see Stephen Biddle, “The New Way of War? Debating the Kosovo Model,” Foreign Affairs
(May–June 2002), pp. 138–44.
52. “Lines of operation” is a term General
Tommy R. Franks used in an address to the
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island,
on 23 May 2002 to describe the different avenues he was employing in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
53. Employing ground forces does increase the
potential for U.S. casualties, and therefore,
critics argue, might undermine the war effort
in a casualty-averse society. A number of
problems exist with this argument. First, casualty aversion seems to have far more to do
with the stakes of the war than a reflexive impulse to avoid putting Americans in harm’s
way. Second, as we learned in Kosovo, taking
ground troops “off the table” simplified the
conflict for the Serbians and led to a belief
that they could endure the bombing while
completing the ethnic cleansing of the province. Such myopic rationality on the part of
NATO to avoid casualties by taking away the
ground force option highlights a third problem: making adaptations easier by simplifying
the war for the enemy can prolong the conflict, thereby actually increasing the total
number of casualties and amount of destruction. For relevant polling data for the war on
terrorism see CNN/USA Today/Gallup, ABC
News/Washington Post, and CBS News, 12
September 2001; Washington Post/ABC
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News, 8 November 2001, and contrast with
polls concerning U.S. forces deploying to
Bosnia in CNN/USA Today, 15–18 December
1995.
54. It is also possible for inputs to strengthen or
weaken a system. For instance, a change to
better leadership, a battlefield victory, and refitting can make an organization more resilient, whereas a change to poor leadership, a
series of defeats, and lack of logistical support
can erode resilience and make an organization more fragile.
55. For further discussion see Kolenda, Uncertainty in War.
56. While physical size is important, for instance,
a large force with poor morale and incompetent leadership is far more fragile than a
smaller force with high morale and superb
leadership.
57. Transitions are characterized by pauses in
war as each side prepares for a subsequent
operation. The period between initial deployment and the conduct of offensive or defensive operations is a transition. The pause that
results when an offensive operation culminates and the unit prepares to defend or resume the offensive is another type of
transition. Likewise, the period between conducting a defensive operation and a subsequent offensive operation is a transition.
These transition periods, and others like
them, are typically times when an organization can recover and restore equilibrium.
58. See Watts, pp. 82–89.
59. See Czerwinski; Beyerchen; and Kolenda,
Uncertainty in War.
60. There seems to exist, therefore, an organizational threshold for the management of transitions. Below a certain number of robust
subordinate units, the organization cannot
dominate both fights. The U.S. Army, for instance, can employ cavalry forces to dominate
transitions in war. These forces are traditionally organized and equipped to operate autonomously in a geographically dispersed
manner to cover the entire battlespace of
their parent unit. Intelligently employed, cavalry organizations give army divisions and
corps the capability to dominate transitions
and thus set the conditions to induce adverse
nonlinear effects on the enemy.
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61. John Boyd’s “conceptual spiral” provides important insight into the transformation and
future of the military. See John Boyd, “Conceptual Spiral,” lecture, Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island, August 1990. For
further discussion of Boyd see Grant Tedrick
Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and
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